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KEY WORDS AND TRICKY PHRASES:
AN ANALYSIS OF PATENT DRAFTER'S
ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT THE
LANGUAGE OF 35 U.S.C. § 112
I. INTRODUCTION
In York Products v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Center, the
Federal Circuit upheld the validity of U.S. Patent No. 4,858,876
entitled "Vehicle Cargo Bed Liner."1 This patent describes a
protective liner for a vehicle, such as the type commonly found in
the bed of a pickup truck. A novel feature of this particular bed
liner includes protective sidewall ridges which align to create
slots.2 The slots allow for the insertion of a structure, such as a
wooden board, to lock a load of cargo in place. The claim litigated
requires the sidewall ridges to extend "a substantial part [] of the
entire height thereof."3  The Court of Appeals held that this
language requires that those ridges cover nearly the entire height
of the sidewall portion of the invention.4
There is nothing unusual about a patent being challenged for
invalidity during a patent infringement suit. Nothing is unusual
about a court upholding the validity of a contested patent. In fact,
patents are presumed valid, and the defendant has the burden of
proof to affirmatively show a contested patent's invalidity.5
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit recognized a continued practice
of patent drafter's use of ambiguous terms of degree in patent
claims. The court assigned a definitive meaning to an apparently
ambiguous term after the patent was issued and litigation com-
menced.
1 99 F.3d 1568, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
2 Id. at 1569.
3 Id. at 1572.
4Id. at 1572-3.
" See Waterloo Furniture Components, Ltd. v. Hayworth, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 489, 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1138 (N.D. II. 1992) (explaining the presumption of validity of issued
patents and requirement to establish facts showing invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence applies to allegations of patent claim indefiniteness).
365
1
Stark: Key Words and Tricky Phrases: An Analysis of Patent Drafters' Att
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1997
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
Make no mistake, "substantial" was a cleverly chosen word
selected by the drafter of the patent claim. However, should patent
claim drafters have the luxury of utilizing flexible terms in the
patent to allow the coverage of the patent to grow after the patent
has issued? How much vagueness should the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) allow patent drafters to include in
the claims when the patent statute explicitly requires particularity
in the claims?
This Note will examine the "gray language," often litigated in
patent cases, utilized by patent claim drafters in an attempt to
circumvent the language of 35 U.S.C. § 112: "The specification [of
a patent] shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention.6  The Federal Circuit has
acknowledged the difficulty and problems that this requirement
instills on prospective patent drafters, however no court has
demanded that the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) require the
removal of "gray language" in patent claims.7
The PTO utilizes the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP) as a guide for patent examiners to follow in the course of
patent prosecution. The MPEP does not prohibit relative terminol-
ogy within the claim language: "Acceptability of the claim language
depends on whether one of ordinary skill in the art would under-
stand what is claimed in light of the specification."' The Federal
Circuit has said that this determination is to be conducted by the
Examiner where "the fact that claim language, including terms of
degree, may not be precise, does not automatically render the claim
indefinite under 35 U.S.C. [§]112."' In the absence of clarification
within the specification of terms of degree or otherwise imprecise
terminology located in the claims, facially ambiguous terminology
within patent claims should be held to be indefinite.
6 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (emphasis added).
'See Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 19,223 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 591 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing the difficulties of complying with 35 U.S.C. § 112).
8 See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2173.05(b) (6th ed. 1996) (designating
the section "Relative Terminology").
9 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2173.05(b) (6th ed. 1996) (citing Seattle
Box Co. v. Industrial Crating and Packaging, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 568
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).
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Specifically, this Note examines six cases which either expand
"gray language" to include an allegedly infringing device or narrow
"gray language" to permit an allegedly infringing device to escape
the gnarled web of infringement. This Note focuses on the use of
the term "substantial" within a patent claim where litigation over
the meaning of the term later develops. 0
II. BACKGROUND
A. A PATENT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT DESIGNED TO BENEFIT
SOCIETY
The Constitution of the United States states that "Congress shall
have the Power ... To Promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to... Inventors the exclusive
Right to their ... Discoveries." 1  In order to accomplish this
Constitutional mandate, Congress established the patent system.
This patent system is founded on the understanding that if
individuals are given the incentive to invent, society as a whole will
benefit.
It is helpful to view the American patent system as a contract
model based on an exchange for value. 2 On one side of the
exchange, the government offers the inventor the sole right to
10 The meaning of the term "substantial" has been litigated in at least sixteen cases: York
Products, 99 F.3d 1568; James River Corp. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.
Wis. 1996); Thorn EMI North America Inc. v. Intel Corp., 936 F. Supp. 1186 (D. Del. 1996);
Application of Curley, 158 F.2d 300, 72 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 116 (C.C.P. 1946); Chad Industries
v. Automation Tooling Systems, 938 F. Supp. 601 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel
Electronics, Inc. 847 F.2d 819, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Ex parts George
et al., 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 575 (PTO Bd. App. 1984); Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v.
Monedison, S.p-.A et al., 494 F. Supp. 370, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 676 (D. Del. 1980); In re
Johnson and Farnham, 558 F.2d 1008, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 187 (C.C.P. 1977); In re
Mattison and Swanson, 509 F.2d 563, 184 U.S.P.Q, (BNA) 484, 486 n.7 (C.C.PA 1975);
Charvet v. Commissioner of Patents, 503 F.2d 138, 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 375 F. Supp. 1, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 353 (N.D. Cal. 1974);
Ex parte Wheeler, 163 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 569 (PTO Bd. App. 1968); Ritter v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
271 F. Supp. 313, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 518 (S.D. N.Y. 1967); Ex parts Oetiker, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641 (Bd. Pat. App & Inter. 1992); In re Nehrenberg, 280 F.2d 161, 126 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 383 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Gregory D. Leibold, Comment, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of
Patent-Infringement Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 623, 626 (1996).
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exclude others from making, using or selling the invention for a
limited period of time."' On the other side of the bargain, the
inventor must initially publicly disclose the best way to make the
invention. Additionally, at the end of the patent term, the patentee
must allow the invention to enter the public domain. A fundamen-
tal policy behind patent law promotes this exchange: "technology
will progress more rapidly if inventors are encouraged to disclose
their inventions rather than trying to horde them as trade se-
crets."
14
By allowing inventors to participate in the patent system, the
progress of technology will emanate in at least two directions to the
benefit of society." First, since patent law encourages invention,
society will enjoy the fruits of the inventor's labor through the
existence of new products of invention. Secondly, by demanding a
written disclosure of the invention as a prerequisite to the granting
of patent protection, patent law requires inventors to "make public
the teachings of their inventions.""6 In theory, this creates a
domino effect where subsequent inventors may use the patentee's
teachings to create other inventions that will also prove useful to
society.
B. CLARITY IS IMPORTANT IN PATENT CLAIMS
The first and second paragraphs of § 112 of the current patent
act require an inventor to make a written disclosure to the public
in exchange for a patent:
The specification shall contain a written description
of the invention, and of the manner and process of
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention.
13 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
14 Leibold, supra note 12, at 626.
Deron Burton, Comment, Bringing Theory Into Practice: Predictable Scope For
Functional Patent Claims, 42 UCLA L. REV. 221, 228 (1994).
16 Id.
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The specification [of a patent] shall conclude with
one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention.
1 7
These two paragraphs require the inventor to disclose the
invention to the public, thereby advancing the current state of
technology. Attention should be paid to the second paragraph
which requires that the claims "particularly point[] out and
distinctly claim" the invention."i The purpose of the claiming
system is to provide the public with fair notice of the boundaries of
a patent." These claims will be used to measure the "metes and
bounds" of the inventor's creation, and it is important for society to
know the precise limits of the patent claims.20
Unfortunately, within the idealistic policies underlying the patent
system, conflicting interests lurk."1 On one hand, patent drafters
should be given "complete and fair protection" for their inven-
tions.22 Otherwise patent grants may lose their "incentive-giving
quality" as inventors have no reason to pursue a hollow, useless
patent grant.2 This suggests that courts should interpret patent
claims broadly to give them a wide scope of protection. On the
other hand, competitors may be discouraged from applying
teachings of patents to make further inventions and innovations if
they cannot rely on claim language to set the boundaries of the
protected invention and to warn precisely of the conduct which will
infringe. This policy suggests that the courts should put great
weight on the language patentees use in claiming their inventions
to strictly limit protection to what those words say. Thus, "judicial
determination of claim meaning and scope of protection is inevita-
bly a balancing act."24
17 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
la Id.
19 Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 945, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
2o In re Vampco Machine and Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 617
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
2' Burton, supra note 15, at 228.
n Burton, supra note 15, at 228.
Burton, supra note 15, at 228.
'4 Burton, supra note 15, at 229.
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The Federal Circuit noted in Markman, Inc. v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc.: "it is only fair that the competitors be able to ascertain
to a reasonable degree the scope of the patentee's right to ex-
clude."2' In an Amicus Curiae brief to the Supreme Court, one
commentator has noted that there are two reasons to somewhat
accurately proscribe the limits of a patent: one is fairness, the other
is a statutory requirement. 2 It may be argued that the primary
purpose of the statutory requirement is to provide express and clear
warning to competitors as to what constitutes infringement of the
patent. Additionally, the statutory requirement provides the public
with a reduced area of uncertainty around which research and
discovery may proceed to "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts" as well as positively notify the patentee of the limits
of the patentee's invention. 7
Particularity in patent claim language is important because a
patent should not unduly inhibit experimentation or obstruct
further advances in the field. The Supreme Court has stated that
"[a] zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may
enter only at the risk of infringement claims would discourage
invention only a little less than unequivocal foreclosure of the
field." 2 The discouragement of invention is obviously inapposite
to the policy of having a patent system.
A third justification for requiring particularity in the claims is to
apprise the inventor of the scope of the invention to which the
inventor has acquired rights. It is important for the inventor to be
able to accurately, as well as reasonably, interpret the scope of the
claims without resorting to constant litigation. The Supreme Court
agrees: "[t]he limits of a patent must be known for the protection
of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive genius of
others and the assurance that the subject of the patent will be
dedicated ultimately to the public."'
25 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1396, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996).
' Amicus Curiae Brief of the Federal Circuit Bar Association in Support of Respondents,
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (No. 92-1049).
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28 Markman, Inc. v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1396.
Id. See also General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369, 37
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 466 (1938) (describing the policy of proving notice to the public).
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C. SOURCES OF AMBIGUITY IN PATENT CLAIMS
In patent law, ambiguity of claim language necessarily results in
uncertainty in the scope of protection. This uncertainty impairs all
of society--the patentee, the competitor, and the public. The
process of determining a particular meaning to define a term in a
patent claim may result in ambiguity.
1. Ordinary Meaning. First, words in a patent are to be given
their ordinary meaning unless otherwise defined.3° However,
what if a particular word has multiple meanings? For example,
consider the word "substantial." The Webster dictionary gives
eleven different definitions of the word substantial.3' Additional-
ly, there are another two definitions specifically provided for the
adverb "substantially." 2 Thus, the "ordinary meaning" is not
clear.
The first definition of the word "substantial" given by the
Webster's Dictionary is "of ample or considerable amount, quantity,
size, etc."3 Supposing that this is the precise definition that the
drafter had in mind when drafting the patent, the meaning of
"ample or considerable amount" appears amorphous. This could
have one of at least the following interpretations: (1) almost all, (2)
more than half, or (3) barely enough to do the job. Therefore, the
use of a term, such as "substantial," which usually has a very
ambiguous meaning, makes the scope of protection particularly
hard to determine.
's Gentex Corp. v. Donnely Corp., 69 F.3d 527,530,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1667 (Fed. Cir.
1995); see also In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(describing process of interpreting claims).
"Webster's definitions of substantial are as follows:
(1) of ample or considerable amount, quantity, size, etc.; (2) of a corporeal
or material nature; real or actual; (3) of solid character or quality; firm,
stout, or strong;, (4) based on solid or firm essentials; (5) wealthy or
influential; (6) of real worth, value or effect; (7) pertaining to the
substance, matter, or material of a thing;, (8) of or pertaining to the
essence of a thing;, essential, material, or important; (9) being a
substance; having independent existence; (10) pertaining to or of the
nature of substance rather than an accident or attribute; (11) something
substantial.
WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 1418
(Portland House ed., 1989).
3 2Id.
3Id.
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2. The Writer's Special Meanings. An additional source of
ambiguity within the patent claim results from the Federal
Circuit's assertion that a patent drafter is "free to be his own
lexicographer.' Effectively, the writer of the patent can attribute
a special meaning to words chosen to describe the invention, as
long as the meaning is not contrary to the ordinary meaning of the
words.' Words chosen by the patent drafter to have a meaning
not commonly associated with those particular words will necessari-
ly create ambiguity with regard to exactly what the patent drafter
intended the particular words to mean. The Federal Circuit
attempts to regulate the practice of lexicography within the body of
a patent by requiring that "any special definition given to a word
must be clearly defined in the specification.' However, in the
process of ascribing a special meaning to a particular term, the
patent drafter may fail to clearly surrender the word's common
definition. In this regard, even more ambiguity will result.
Suppose that the patentee has chosen to give a special meaning
to a term in a patent claim. In order to interpret the meaning of
a term in a patent claim, "resort must be had in the first instance
to the words of the claim,"37 but the courts have additionally
required a reading into the specification." This inherently means
that the public cannot now rely on the claims of the patent alone:
"[c]laims must be read in view of the specification, of which they
are a part .... For claim construction purposes, the [specifica-
tion's] description may act as a sort of dictionary, which explains
the invention and may define terms used in the claims."39 The
specification itself is also likely to contain terminology which may
be interpreted in a variety of different ways.
" Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See also
WEBSTER'S, supra note 31, at 825 (defining lexicographer as "a writer or a compiler of a
dictionary").
35 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2173.05(a) (6th ed. 1996) (requiring a
term may not be given a meaning repugnant to its usual meaning).
' Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d at 980.
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co, 339 U.S. 605, 610, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
328 (1950).
' Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516,547 (1871) (stating "it is fundamental that claims are
to be construed in the light of specifications and both are to be read with a view to
ascertaining the invention').
'9 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d at 979.
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3. The Effect of the Prosecution History on Meaning. In addition
to the Supreme Court mandate to construe claims in light of the
specification, other courts have held that in order to ascertain the
meaning of the claims, the court should look to the prosecution
history as well.' Although ambiguity will not likely be introduced
by an examination of the patent's prosecution history, the public
will not know by looking at the patent itself whether or not the file
wrapper should be obtained for examination. The expectation that
the public may need to reference the prosecution history to define
ambiguous claim language places an unnecessary burden on the
public when the patent statute explicitly requires the patentee to
particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention.
Finally, the Federal Circuit requires that claim construction take
into account "the specification of the patent, the prosecution
history, and the prior art."'1 Requiring prior art to be taken into
account imposes a huge burden on users of the patent system. This
imposition will require a determination of which prior art is
relevant in construing the claims of a particular patent. Both sides
in many disagreements will likely be able to find prior art that is
favorable to their respective arguments. For example, one source
has identified over one hundred connotations for the word "substan-
tial" that exist in issued patents."2 An examination of these
patents would most certainly yield interpretations favorable to
either side of a disagreement.
The Supreme Court has recently noted that "we see the impor-
tance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent .... 4 In
order to achieve uniformity, individuals must wade through the
mire of ambiguity and uncertainty that may arise in regards to
claim interpretation. Courts have also acknowledgcd that patent
claim language is inherently susceptible to dispute over its
meaning." It would appear that a step in the direction of elimi-
Smithbline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
41 Intervet Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Lab., Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1053,12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1474
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
IRwIN M. AISENBERG, ArORNEYS DICTIONARY OF PATENT CLAIMS S-91 (Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc. ed., 1987).
4 Markman, Inc. v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1396 (1996).
See Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (stating that
"[c]laims cannot be clear and unambiguous on their face .... The very nature of words
would make a clear and unambiguous claim a rare occurrence.*).
1997] 373
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nating some disputes over claim language interpretation would be
to disallow inventors the use of words that are ambiguous on their
face within the body of the claims. Words like "substantial" or
"substantially" are amorphous; they inherently defy the require-
ment of "particularly pointing out" and "distinctly claiming" the
invention sought to be patented.45
Inherently ambiguous terminology such as "substantial" and
"substantially" should not be allowed within the claims of a patent.
One possible exception could be to allow this type of terminology in
the claims only where the patent drafter explicitly defines the
apparently ambiguous term within the body of the specification.
D. AMBIGUOUS PATENT CLAIMS ARE BAD POLICY
A patent owner has the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the claimed invention in the United States for a
term of twenty years from the date of filing the patent applica-
tion.46 The patent statute allows a patent owner to file a civil
proceeding against anyone thought by the patentee to be making,
using or selling the patented invention without permission of the
patent owner. 47 This type of activity is known as patent infringe-
ment.
Establishing patent infringement is not a simple exercise. In
most instances, it is a two-step process. 48 The first step, the one
that is highly prejudiced by ambiguous claim language, requires the
court to construe the meaning of the claim language.49 The
second step requires the fact-finder to apply the claims, as con-
strued in the first step, to the accused infringing product or
processes "in order to determine whether the accused product or
process falls within the scope of the claims."'o
Applying the claims to the accused device may lead to one of two
categories of patent infringement: literal infringement or infringe-
45 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
41 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994).
48 Burton, supra note 15, at 222.
49 Burton, supra note 15, at 222.
50 Burton, supra note 15, at 222.
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ment under the doctrine of equivalents.51 If an accused device
includes every limitation stated in a patent claim, the accused
device literally infringes the claim. The process for determining
literal infringement is stringent; "if even a single claim limitation
has no [corresponding equivalent] in the accused device, there can
be no literal infringement. 2 Because of the stringency of the
test, however, literal infringement is rarely successful in prac-
tice.5
By utilizing nebulous language, a patent drafter may be able to
create a flexible patent that allows a particular element to expand
in order to encompass an alleged infringer. It is entirely possible
that the patentee had not sought expanded protection during its
prosecution through the PTO. The court is then forced to create a
patent claim interpretation that was not contemplated by the PTO
and could be invalid for obviousness in light of the prior art, lack
of novelty, or any other reason commonly utilized by the PTO to
invalidate claims. At this point in time, the court is most likely not
privy to the type of information needed and the processes necessary
to evaluate the patent claims for other invalidity concerns. A
skillful patent drafter may avoid these invalidity concerns by
relying on flexible patent claims in patent infringement suits.
The second category of patent infringement is utilized when the
court does not find the allegedly infringing device to literally
infringe the patent. The doctrine of equivalents is an equitable
determination conducted when the claim language does not literally
read on the accused device, but where the alleged infringer has
made only minor, pretextural changes.5 Even where an accused
device does not literally infringe a patent claim, infringement may
occur under the doctrine of equivalents if the accused device
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same
way to achieve substantially the same result as the claimed
invention.' An accused device that satisfies this so-called
tripartite function/way/result test is legally "equivalent" to the
51 Burton, supra note 15, at 222.
Burton, supra note 15, at 223.
53 Burton, supra note 15, at 223.
"Burton, supra note 15, at 223.
"Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co, 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (emphasis
added).
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claimed invention, and thus infringes the patent."
When ambiguous claim language is examined under the doctrine
of equivalents, there is no telling what a fact finder will determine.
What performs or achieves substantially the same function, way,
and result as a claim requiring a given element to extend "at least
a substantial part of the entire height thereof?" The requirement
that "the language of the claim defines the scope of the protected
invention" is circumvented by the patent drafter by the creation of
amorphous, ambiguous claims when analyzed under the doctrine of
equivalents.57
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE COURTS' CONFUSION
At least sixteen cases have been litigated to some extent over
ambiguity created by the inclusion of the term "substantial" within
the body of a patent claim.' This Note will focus on six of these
cases showing that various courts are not arriving at a consistent
meaning of this term. Judge McKelvie observed in Thorn EMI
North America, Inc. v. Intel Corp. that the term "substantial"
typically takes on little meaning during patent prosecution, but
upon issuance, the patentee often allows this term to "swell[] up"
to encompass potential infringers.59 When courts allow this
amorphous word to expand after issuance, the patent drafters are
rewarded through successful circumvention of the objectives of 35
U.S.C. § 112, by failing to particularly point out and distinctly
claim their inventions.
1. In re Curley. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the
predecessor to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals over some
jurisdictional matters, entertained a disagreement over the term
"substantially" as early as 1946.' In In re Curley, the applicant
appealed from an affirmation of a denial of Curley's patent
Id
5 Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615,
619, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1816 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
5 See supra note 10.
936 F. Supp. 1186, 1198 (D. Del. 1996).
e In re Curley, 158 F.2d 300, 72 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 116 (C.C.PA 1946).
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application by the United States Patent Office's Board of Ap-
peals.61 The applicant's invention related to an improved ventila-
tor for use in underground mines.62 Claim 1 of this patent
includes a motor and controlling switch in a "substantially complete
enclosure.' The Board of Appeals held that this language would
not exclude an "enclosure having apertures or [be] restricted to a
housing or covering that is completely closed." Because prior art
teaches the inclusion of a housing with apertures, the Board
sustained the rejection of the patent application.
The applicant argued that the patent's use of the term "substan-
tially enclosed" required that no apertures for ventilation or other
purposes be used. The applicant relied on a description of coal
mines in the Electrical Engineer's Handbook which stresses the
importance of enclosed motors and controls due to risk of explo-
sion.' The applicant was able to convince the court to allow other
claims. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the board's decision
holding that "a 'substantially complete enclosure,' is sufficiently
broad to include a device which is not restricted.., to a housing
or covering which completely encloses the motor and the controlling
switch."66
When defining "substantially complete enclosure," the court did
not refer to an ordinary meaning of the words, but determined that
"[substantially] is a relative term and should be interpreted in
accordance with the context of the claim in which it is used." 7
The court does not mention the specification, the prosecution
history, or the prior art for guidance in interpreting the claim. The
court simply determined that "[t]he word 'substantially' does not
necessarily have the same meaning as the word 'essentially.'"
Had the court adopted the interpretation sought by the patent
applicant, the patentee would have effectively obtained a monopoly
over prior art which included ventilation apertures. This runs
61 d. at 301.
ai d1
a Id. at 302.
Id. at 303 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 304.
Ild.
67 Id,
6I Id.
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afoul of the policies of the patent system as the PTO would have
granted a patent for technology currently in use. The court in this
instance, however, recognized the possible harmful effects of
granting a flexible patent claim in the patent.
2. Exparte Wheeler. In 1969, the Patent Office Board of Appeals
had another opportunity to determine what "substantially" may
mean in the context of a patent claim."9 Once again a different
definition and interpretation was obtained. In Ex parte Wheeler, a
patent application was determined to be patentable despite a
dispute concerning the term "substantial."70 In this action, the
Board held that "[a] surface which is 'substantially parallel' to a
fixed direction is to all intents and purposes, disposed as closely
parallel to such direction as is humanly possible."71 Furthermore,
the Board holds that "[s]substantially is to be differentiated from
approximately."72
The Board made no reference to a basis for the interpretation of
"substantially parallel" in this situation. No reference is made to
interpretation in light of the claims, the specification, the prosecu-
tion history, or the prior art. The Board simply states that
"substantially" is not "approximately" and further requires that the
surfaces be as parallel as "humanly possible." 3 This interpreta-
tion gives very little flexibility imparted to this term as one may
commonly expect. Especially when the MPEP has described
"substantially" as "a broad term."74
3. York Products, Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Center.
U.S. Patent No. 4,958,876 entitled "Vehicle Cargo Bed Liner" is
owned by York Products.75 The invention behind this patent is a
protective liner suitable for use in a vehicle cargo body, such as the
type commonly utilized in the bed of a pickup truck. A particularly
novel aspect of this invention is the special sidewalls of the bed
liner. These sidewalls contain protective ridges which align
* Ex parte Wheeler, 163 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 569 (FO Bd. App. 1968).
7 0 Id. at 569-70.7 1 Id. at 570.
72 Id.
73ld.
74 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2173.05 (6th ed. 1996).
"' York Prods. Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1569 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
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oppositely to create load bearing slots into which a user may insert
a plank to serve as a cargo lock, thus preventing cargo from sliding
in the bed of the vehicle.76
Central Tractor has manufactured two models of bed liners for
Custom Ford that York believes infringe this patent." As a result
of the suspected infringement, York brought suit for damages. The
Federal Circuit followed the two step approach to determine first
the meaning of the disputed claims, and second, if the allegedly
infringing product fell within the scope of the claims.
In carrying out the first step of delineating the meaning of the
disputed claims, the court acknowledged that "[t]he claim language,
of course, defines the bounds of claim scope."7  The Federal
Circuit implicitly conceded that there is ambiguity in the claims in
question. The court expressed its desire to consider other sources
including the patent specification and the prosecution history in
order to arrive at the meaning of the disputed claims.79 The text
of this claim must be examined to see why the Federal Circuit
quickly referred to extrinsic sources to determine the meaning of
the claim:
Claim 1 states as follows:
A protective liner for a vehicle cargo bed, said protec-
tive liner permitting structure positioned in the
vehicle cargo bed to be supported and affixed in
position in the cargo bed, said liner comprising: a
liner floor portion positionable upon the floor of the
vehicle cargo bed, said liner floor portion having
elevated portions formed thereupon to conform to
wheel wells protruding from the vehicle cargo bed
floor; liner sidewall portions extending upwardly
from opposite sides of the liner floor portion, one of
each of said liner sidewall portions being positionable
7oId.
77 I& at 1570-71.
78 Id. at 1572. See Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications
Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 619-20 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (describing importance of claim language).
79 York Prods., 99 F.3d at 1572. "To determine the meaning of disputed claim terms,
however, a construing court may consider other sources, including the patent specification
and the administrative record leading to patent issuance." Whittaker Corp. v. UNR Indus.,
Inc., 911 F.2d 709, 711, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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against one of a pair of opposite sidewalls of the
vehicle cargo bed; a liner frontwall portion extending
upwardly from a front end of the liner floor portion,
said liner front-wall portion being positionable
against a frontwall of the vehicle cargo bed; and a
plurality of spaced apart, vertically extend[ing] ridge
members protruding in a common plan[e] from the
liner sidewall portions for at least a SUBSTANTIAL 17
part of the entire height thereof whereby gaps sepa-
rating adjacent ones of the ridge members of each
liner sidewall portion from co-operative opposed load
locks of a depth sufficient to receive opposite ends of
the structure positioned in the vehicle cargo bed in
order to affix the structure against movement in a
direction parallel to said liner sidewall portion in the
vehicle cargo bed.'
Although the Federal Circuit affirmed the holding of the district
court, the Federal Circuit found at least one different meaning of
"substantial" to be significant. The district court defined the
limitation "at least a substantial part of the entire height thereof"
to mean "the ridge member must protrude from near the bottom to
near the top of the liner sidewall."8 ' One of the interested parties
in the litigation did not like this interpretation of the term
"substantial" and subsequently appealed the district court's decision
to the Federal Circuit. Although the Federal Circuit affirmed the
decision as to the meaning of the term "substantial" in this case,
the Federal Circuit, in dicta, ascribed a slightly different meaning
to the term.
The Federal Circuit interpreted the meaning of the phrase
describing the height of the ridges: " 'Substantially the entire
height thereof' simply means that the ridges must cover nearly the
entire length of the sidewall .... A projection in the sidewall that
does not span nearly the entire distance from the top to the bottom
of the sidewall does not meet this limitation." 2 The Federal
Circuit did not mention how the district court arrived at its
so York Prods., 99 F.3d at 1572 (emphasis added).
81 Id. (emphasis added).
SId
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interpretation of this claim, but attributed the Federal Circuit's
correct interpretation to the patent prosecution history where the
limitation was claimed to be added by the applicant. 1
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit attested that the court was
giving the claim its "ordinary meaning" since the patent "discloses
no novel uses of claim words.' Likely, fewer than one percent of
the patents that used the term "substantial" ascribe a specific
definition to the word unless the patent drafter defined every word
in the patent claim explicitly within the body of the specification.
Nevertheless, utilizing the "ordinary meaning" philosophy, the
court consulted a dictionary and picked out one of the numerous
choices which must have been present to definitively state:
"Ordinarily ... 'substantially' means 'considerable in ... ex-
tent.' '" However, the court continued in analyzing the term,
further refining the definition to include: "largely but not wholly
that which is specified. ' Although "considerable in extent" and
"largely but not wholly that which is specified" may sometimes be
equivalent ways of describing a similar attribute, some situations
may arise where only one of these two choices may be applicable to
a given use of the term "substantial."
Instead of providing clear guidance for future patent drafters, the
Federal Circuit perpetuated the use of this ambiguous word even
though the Federal Circuit found at least two other applicable
interpretations." By deferring to the district court's previous
interpretation, "substantial" is certain to be interpreted in multiple
ways. Furthermore, a third alternative interpretation was alleged
by the Federal Circuit to have an equivalent meaning to the
meanings developed by both the Federal Circuit and the district
court 88
3 Id.
" Id. Without an express intent to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor's
claim terms take on their ordinary meaning. Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948,
951, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
" York Prods., 99 F.3d at 1572-3. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY COLLEGE
EDITION 1213 (2d ed. 1982) (having multiple definitions of "substantial").
"York Prods., 99 F.3d at 1573. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
1176 (9th ed. 1983) (containing even more alternative definitions of "substantial").
87 York Prods., 99 F.3d at 1572.3.
88 Id. at 1573 (stating "the modifier "substantially" conveys that the ridge members
extend over most of the 'entire height' of the sidewall portions").
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The Federal Circuit's affirmation of the district court's interpreta-
tion of the meaning of the language of the claim is awkward. The
Federal Circuit interprets "substantial" to require a sidewall that
"cover[s] nearly the entire length."8 9 The trial court held that the
language required the sidewall to extend from "near the bottom to
near the top."9o These two interpretations are somewhat different
as is the alternate interpretation given by the court as "extend[ing]
over most of the 'entire height.' "9 A third court would likely
ascribe a fourth meaning to this amorphous phrase, if not a fifth,
sixth or seventh meaning.
The Federal Circuit did not merely affirm the district court's
determination that "at least a substantial part of the entire height
thereof' means extending from "near the bottom to near the top. 9 2
Finding further clarification necessary, the court placed additional
limitations on this phrase and justified the limitations on the
"language and syntax" of the claims. 93 The court hypothesized
that "if 'substantial part' meant only ample height to accomplish a
purpose, the claim would need to read 'only so much height as
necessary to affix a structure against movement.' " Perhaps this
is exactly what the patent drafter believed was captured by the
term "substantial" acting in reliance on previous uses of the term
upheld in other patent infringement cases.95 However, this court,
this day, held that this interpretation would be a "redraft ...
essentially strip[ping] many words in the claim of their mean-
ing."9' Perhaps the meaning attributed to this phrase by the court
is a "redraft" of the intention of the patentee.
The Federal Circuit boldly stated that the specification and the
drawings support the district court's interpretation of the claim.97
The court held that "the scope of the claims is not necessarily
limited to the specific embodiments described in the specifica-
89 Id. at 1572.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1573.
Id. at 1572.Id. at 1573.
"See supra note 10.
gYork Prods., 99 F.3d at 1573.
1Id.
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tion".9" Remarkably, the York Products court found that because
the specification does not suggest that less than the entire height
is contemplated, then it has been disclaimed." This specification
is conveniently not included as a reference because it is likely
ambiguous and would not support the Federal Circuit's finding.
Furthermore, an examination of the drawings provided in the case,
Figures 2 and 7, portray two different load lock arrangements
within the bed liner of the truck, neither of which is higher than
three quarters of the height of the protective liner.1" Apparently
the court did not understand the simple mechanics involved with
this invention when it states: "At no point does the specification
suggest that 'at least a substantial part of the entire height [of the
sidewall]' means less than the entire height of the sidewall."10'
The Federal Circuit must have felt some unease about its
analysis of the meaning of the term "substantial" as the court
utilized a separate claim that did not adhere to this language to
remand the case back to the district court. The term "substantial"
cannot be treated by either an alleged infringer or a patentee as a
definitive term to which a court will ascribe a known meaning. In
this case, "substantial" was held to mean near the bottom to near
the top. In other situations, this flexible term may adopt alterna-
tive meanings, even in the absence of specific definitive language
within the specification.
4. Amhil Enterprises Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc. The next case of
interest concerning the interpretation of the term "substantial" is
Amhil Enterprises Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc.'12 Amhil is the assignee of
U.S. Patent No. 4,421,244 entitled "Plastic Lids for Containers."
The '244 patent describes a plastic container lid that improves over
prior lids because of three features. First, the patent claims to
improve the fabrication process by utilizing a lid that separates
more easily from a mold.Y°8 Secondly, the size is smaller, which
facilitates shipping and storage as less volume is consumed by the
Id
*Id
'
06 Id. at 1570.
1O1 Id. at 1573.
'0' S1 F.3d 1554, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1996).10 Id. at 1556.
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individual lids.'" Finally, the lid's design has an "enhanced
rim-gripping ability" to provide for a more "secure hold.""*°
Amhil alleged that Wawa, among others, provided allegedly
infringing cup lids to customers for covering beverages purchased
at Wawa stores. The court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment of noninfringement of the '244 patent upon
finding no infringement of the '244 patent.'0° The plaintiff
appealed this issue in a case before the Federal Circuit.
Claim 1 was the subject of the alleged infringement action in the
'244 patent, and part of that claim requires:
1. A lid for containers, made of thin, flexible plastic
for mounting on and receiving the bead of a contain-
er, comprising: a central panel; a cavity...; means
connecting said cavity to said central panel; a skirt
portion extending downwardly from said cavity; said
skirt portion having a plurality of outwardly extend-
ing projections, each having a SUBSTANTIALLY verti-
cal face with substantially vertical side edges, and
SUBSTANTIALLY vertical side walls extending inward-
ly from said face; the portions of said skirt
forming an undercut...; said outwardly extending
projections... terminating .... 107
The claim construction issues centered on two arguments. The first
dealt with whether the "cavity" of the accused lids opened "down-
wardly and inwardly" as required by the third paragraph of claim
1.10° The second issue, "hotly contested" by the opposing parties,
was whether the "outwardly extending projections" of the accused
lids had "substantially vertical" faces, side edges, and walls.'09
Without citing precedent, Judge Rich began his analysis of the
meaning of the "substantial" term by examining the figures
104 Id.
'6 1d. at 1557.
106 Amhil Enters. LtdL v. Wawa, Inc., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1645 (D. Md. 1995).
"'
1 Amhil, 81 F.3d at 1558.9.
"a6 Id. at 1559.
109 Id.
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included within the patent. " ' Although he noted that the pre-
ferred embodiment, as may be illustrated by the patent drawings,
does not necessarily or automatically limit the scope of a patentee's
claims, in this case, the Federal Circuit considered the drawings
first to determine the meaning of the term "substantial."111 Next,
the Federal Circuit noted that "[tihe entire specification, including
all of the claims, the prosecution history, and the prior art may all
affect the interpretation ultimately placed on [the] claim lan-
guage."112 The court did not discuss the "ordinary meaning" of
the term "substantial"; the Federal Circuit did not utilize the
ordinary meaning test until six months later when deciding the
York Products case."'
On the facts of the case, the patent drafter did a much poorer job
of creating a smoke screen as to what was meant by the term
"substantial" than was done by the '876 patent drafter in the York
Products case. Within claim 1, the drafter appears to use "substan-
tially vertical face" and "vertical face" interchangeably. " 4 Fur-
thermore, the court held that the specification creates the impres-
sion that the drafter intended for "substantially vertical" and
"vertical" to mean the same thing." 5 However, the court does not
acknowledge the unlikeliness and impracticability that a patent
drafter would go to the trouble to include the "substantial" term
unless creating some flexibility as to the degree of vertical required
by the invention.
An examination of the prosecution history of the '244 patent
reveals flaws in the plaintiffs argument causing it to unravel.
Plastic container lids are a crowded art, implying that many
different inventions deal with this subject. When Amhil obtained
the '244 patent, Amhil had to distinguish the '244 patent from prior
art. During the prosecution, the patent examiner cited U.S. Patent
No. 4,194,645 as making the '244 patent obvious. 16  The '645
1 Id.
1 Id .
"S York Prods. Inc.v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1572-73 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
114 Amhil, 81 F.3d at 1558-59 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
"
5 Id. at 1559.
Id. at 1560.
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patent was a plastic lid with sloping vertical faces. In order to
overcome the obviousness rejection, the applicant distinguished the
'645 patent on the basis of the slope of the projecting faces. This
allowed the Federal Circuit to conclude that "'substantially
vertical' may be properly interpreted as not including lids with
sloping faces like those of the Zabner '645 patent.1
17
In other responses to the PTO, the patentee used "substantially
vertical" and "vertical" interchangeably, which encouraged the court
to hold that "substantially vertical" is essentially "vertical.""
Claims should be construed when possible to sustain their validi-
ty."9 In the '244 patent, the court held that "substantially
vertical face" means the same or as very close to "vertical face." 20
The court utilized prior art depicting outwardly extending projec-
tions of the same angle used by the accused infringer to arrive at
this interpretation. 2' The court held that this is the only inter-
pretation which will maintain the validity of this claim in light of
the crowded area of prior art.'22 In sum, the court concluded, "we
interpret claim 1 to include only lids wherein the outwardly
extending projections have well-defined faces that deviate only
slightly, if at all, from the vertical.""2
5. Chad Industries, Inc. v. Automation Tooling Systems, Inc.
Once again, a court must interpret nebulous terms, including the
meaning of "substantial." The patent at issue was U.S. Patent No.
4,910,859 entitled "Circuit Assembly System."' 24 This patent
"describes a type of robotic mechanism for putting electrical
components (e.g., resistors, capacitors, and microprocessors) on
printed circuit boards and securing them in place.""2 The robotic
arm moves the electrical component precisely over holes in the
circuit board and places them into the board with an accuracy of
117 Id. at 1561 (emphasis added).
"8 Id. at 1562.
119 ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
929 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
'20 Amhil, 81 F.3d at 1562.
'MId.
I ld.
Chad Indus., Inc. v. Automation Tooling Sys., Inc., 938 F. Supp. 601, 605 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
n d.
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within one thousandth of an inch.126 The technique used to
temporarily hold the components in place before the soldering
process is called "clinching."127
Clinching involves the bending of the component's leads sideways
underneath the circuit board. Traditionally, there are two clinching
methods: either positioning a barrier under the circuit board
against a wire lead and moving the board until the lead is bent, or
alternatively holding the board still and moving the barrier against
the lead until the lead is bent.128 Chad's patent proposes a new
method that attaches both uniform and non-uniform components by
using a clinching device that is able to bend a lead in any direction
and at any angle.129 This new method uses a clinching pin
sticking up from a movable table below the circuit board. The
clinching pin clinches the component at the desired angle and
performs at a reported speed of up to one hundred inches per
second.13 ° The pin also retracts allowing it to miss obstacles
which may be in its way from clinching point to clinching point.13
1
Chad's patent comprises fifty-one claims, however the court
contemplates only claim one. The clinching pin operation described
in claim one requires "means for driving said clinching element
through a programmably determined path of travel substantially
within a plane adjacent said lower surface ... 132 The adversar-
ies in this disagreement have diametrically opposing views so as to
whether this claim allows the pin to avoid obstacles outside the
plane of travel. The plaintiff, Chad Industries, asserted that the
claim's use of the word "substantially" encompassed the ability to
avoid obstacles outside of the plane of travel. 133 However, the
defendant, Automation Tooling, adamantly opposed this interpreta-
tion and argued that the claims of the patent require the pin to
move "entirely in single horizontal plane."134
'
8Id.
Id. at 605-06.
'2 Id. at 606.
130 Id.
131 Id.
'n Id. at 607-08 (emphasis added).13 Id.
"4 Id. at 607.
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The court first examined the claim language to determine which
interpretation of the claim would prevail." Then, utilizing the
claims, the specification, and the prosecution history, the court
determined the meaning of the claims."l 6 The court held that
Chad's claim could "cover a system whose clinching pin goes down
and up before it has finished bending all the leads on a particular
component."137 The court found support for this holding in the
claim, within the body of the specification, and alternatively from
extrinsic evidence of how one skilled in the art of clinching would
interpret the meaning of this terminology.lm The court in this
case arrived at a broad interpretation of the word "substantially."
Significant analysis into the specification as well as the prosecution
history was required for this interpretation.
6. Thorn EMI North America, Inc. v. Intel, Corp. The final case
to be examined by this Note on the interpretation of the word
"substantial" is Thorn EMI v. North America, Inc. v. Intel,
Corp.139 The patentee, Thorn, brought an infringement action
against a competitor, Intel, alleging patent infringement of its U.S.
Patent No. 4,486,943 which claims "an improved method for
fabricating metal oxide semiconductor field effect transistors.., in
a large scale integrated circuit.""4 Claim one, paragraph (e) of
the patent, requires "heat driving the implanted source/drain region
until its side edge is substantially aligned with the previously
separated side edge of the gate electrode, whereby the source/drain
edge is aligned with the gate electrode edge and there is substan-
tially zero overlap."14 ' The patentee and the defendant disputed
the meaning of the claim language "substantially zero overlap" and
"substantially aligned."'42 The defendant asserted that this
language allowed absolutely no overlap to occur, but the patentee
asserted the language meant that a ten percent tolerance of the
' Id, at 606 (citing North Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. American Cynamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571,1575,
28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).18 Chad Indus., 938 F. Supp. at 608 (citing Markman, Inc. v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
52 F.3d 967, 979 (sic] (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
fs Id. at 608.
1 3 Id. at 608-610.
936 F. Supp. 1186 (D. Del. 1996).140 Id. at 1188-89.
1 Id. at 1189 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 1197-98.
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gate electrodes length was permissible.1' The court rejected both
parties' interpretations of the phrases "substantially zero overlap"
and "substantially aligned."1"
Intel relied heavily on Amhil Enterprises, Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc. and
attempted to read the word "substantially" out of the claims."
The court noted that Amhil interpreted the claim's language
"substantially vertical face" as "the same as or very close to 'vertical
face.'""" However, this court distinguished Amhil on the facts
because they related to a crowded art that compelled a narrow
construction of the claim language and dealt with a physical object
whose dimensions were easy to measure as opposed to the submi-
croscopic measurements involved in Thorn."7 Furthermore, the
Thorn court also noted that unlike the Amhil claim, which used the
phrases "substantially vertical" and "vertical" interchangeably, the
Thorn claim did not use the phrases "substantially aligned" and
"aligned" interchangeably.'" For these reasons, the district court
rejected the defendant's interpretation.
Conversely, the patentee requested that a tolerance of plus or
minus ten percent be assigned to the word "substantially" based on
the testimony of an expert witness.'49  Because the expert
changed his testimony on what an expert in the field would expect
from a range of plus or minus five percent to ten percent, the court
disregarded this inconsistent testimony. Additional testimony
revealed that the asserted range of inaccuracy would lead to a
poorly performing MOS transistor which was precisely the problem
that this transistor sought to avoid.i s
The court noted that "[t]he word 'substantially' tends to become
somewhat of a chameleon when it appears in patent claims.
" 151
Judge McKelvie observed that during prosecution, the word takes
on little substance or importance, but upon issuance, the term
143 1&
'I d. at 1197-98.
'4 1& at 1197.
'
4 Id. at 1198 (citing Amhil Enterprises, Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d 1554,1562 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
147 Thorn, 81 F.3d at 1198.
148 Id. at 1197.
'
49 Id. at 1198.
"
1 id.15 I .
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"swells up to envelop potentially infringing products or process-
es." 152 Judge McKelvie further noted the awkward position the
court is placed in when interpreting the claims for the jury,
especially where a "chameleon" is present within the claims.'53
Upon looking to the ordinary meaning of "substantially" in the
dictionary, the court was frustrated by a definition proving to be
"practically useless as a guide to understanding or decision.""'
In some circumstances, the court suggested that the language in
the claims, specification or prosecution history may provide
guidance as to how to interpret this language, but the court
admitted that the meaning is ambiguous when no guidance is
given. 155
In this case, the court rejected both parties' interpretations of
"substantially" and defined the term as "the same as or very close
to." The court held this construction to be based on "the many
references to zero overlap and perfect alignment in the patent and
the prosecution history and the stated importance in the specifica-
tion of near-perfect alignment for the speed and efficiency of the
'943 patent.
" 157
B. ALLOWANCE OF THE USE OF THE TERM "SUBSTANTIAL" IS BAD
POLICY
When the PTO allows a patent drafter the flexibility to include
terms like "substantial" or "substantially" in the claims of a patent,
the drafter adeptly circumvents 35 U.S.C. § 112. No longer can a
competitor judge the scope of one's invention by the specific
language utilized by the claim. No longer can the public rely on
the language of the claim without resort to the specification.
Furthermore, the public may be forced to make a determination of
the interpretation of the terms by referring to prosecution history
or possibly even through examination of prior art.
12 Id,
163 Id.
'5 Id. at 1198-99.
INId.
5 Id. at 1199.
157 id.
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The patent drafter should not be able to intentionally create a
flexible patent claim using terminology such as the term "substan-
tial." Flexible terminology may pass through the patent prosecu-
tion stage unnoticed, or at least given little consideration, by a
patent examiner. Once the patent issues, the patentee may later
assert this same terminology as having significant meaning.
Interpretation by the courts may allow this type of claim to swallow
up would-be infringers. In effect, the use of the term "substantial"
literally defeats the specific language of § 112. Neither "substan-
tial" nor "substantially" can be found to "particularly point out" and
"distinctly claim" anything. "Substantial" is an amorphous word
that the patentee hopes will be disregarded during patent prosecu-
tion only to grow, upon issuance, into a monster of a monopoly.
In just the six cases examined, at least a dozen different
interpretations for the term "substantial" and "substantially" were
defined by the various courts. No court gave a concrete definition
of the term. For instance, recall York Products where the court
affirmed that in bed liner technology "at least a substantial part of
the entire height thereof' meant "near the bottom to near the top"
even though the court also held that the height must "cover nearly
the entire length."1" Notice that the Federal Circuit did not
necessitate which direction the ridges must be close to, only "nearly
the entire length."159 Using the dictionary, the York Products
court discovered definitions which were not selected." ° Further-
more, a third definition was found to conclude that "substantial"
"conveys that the ridge members extend over most of the 'entire
height' of the sidewall portions."161 In this case alone, three
slightly differing interpretations arose. Unfortunately, this court
failed to insist on the importance of particularity and definiteness
in the patent claim language to solve the problem.
The court inAmhil determined that "substantially vertical" faces
could only be interpreted to mean the same as "vertical" due to the
patent drafter's interchanging of the terms within the body of both
the claims and specification.6 2 The court utilized a statement
18 99 F.3d. 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
W9Id.
1 6 Id. at 1572-73.
161 Id at 1573.
162 81 F.3d 1554. 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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made to the PTO by Amhil asserting that "substantially vertical"
did not include lids with sloping faces like a particular prior art
reference.' 3 The court held that the faces could deviate "only
slightly, if at all from the vertical."'" Effectively, this court held
that "substantial" was meaningless within the body of these claims
both literally as well as under the doctrine of equivalents.
In the Curley case, the court held that "substantially complete
enclosure" could possibly include ventilation slots which would
encompass prior art and therefore disallowed the patent applica-
tion."' This is not the interpretation of the term "substantial" as
applied in the Amhil case. In fact, this was a broad interpretation
utilized by the court to negate the argument made by Curley which
suggested that "substantially" meant "essentially."' 1  However,
the court in Amhil effectively stated that "substantially" meant
"essentially."
In Ex parte Wheeler, the court held that "substantially parallel"
effectively meant essentially parallel when it held that the two
surfaces must be as closely to parallel as is humanly possible." 7
Furthermore, "substantially" does not mean "approximately."'6
However, the Chad court granted the term great flexibility by
allowing "means for driving said clinching element through a
programmably determined path of travel substantially within a
plane adjacent said lower surface" to include the movement of the
clinching element in a perpendicular direction to avoid obsta-
cles.169 The Chad court allowed "travel substantially within a
plane" to include intentional travel outside of that plane. "Substan-
tially" appears to be interpreted as "occasionally" according to this
court.
Lastly, in Thorn, the court was totally frustrated by the use of
the terminology "substantially aligned" and "substantially zero
overlap." The court held that "substantially" meant "the same as
or very close to" after rejecting two opposing interpretations
'
63 Id. at 1561.
'64 Id. at 1562.
16 158 F.2d 300, 303 (C.C.P.A. 1946).
'Id. at 304.
'67 163 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 569, 570 (PTO Bd. App. 1968).
168 Id.
" 938 F. Supp. 601, 608 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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proffered by the parties.17 This seems to be a compromise
between the "essentially" type of interpretations found in York
Products, Amhil, and Wheeler and the open-ended interpretations
found in the Chad and Curley cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The results of not allowing the use of amorphous terms in patent
claim language will benefit the patentee, the competitor, the PTO
and all of the public--in a sense, there is no loser. The only party
disadvantaged is the prospective patentee who wishes to attempt
to monopolize more than legally allowable and then enforce this
expanded patent against an alleged infringer. The claims of this
expanded patent would not have been prosecuted with the same
meaning as now ascribed by the patentee and would serve to be a
detriment to the common good. Elimination of this type of
language within the patent claim by forcing patent applicants to
observe 35 U.S.C. § 112 would benefit society as a whole.
Admittedly, if a few dozen words of the same amorphousness as
"substantial" were precluded from use in patent claims, the ability
of one to claim the invention would be somewhat limited. However,
this limitation would not prove to be unduly burdensome. Theoreti-
cally, less infringement would occur because competitors would
better understand the boundaries of the patentee's monopoly. Also,
litigation would be initiated in fewer cases because the patentee
and the alleged infringer would be in a better position to predict
the outcome of a lengthy and expensive trial. The applicant would
not be harmed because the patent attorney would know which
words were "off limits" in the claim section of a patent. The
inventor would not be aware of any change in policy or coverage of
his invention.
As mentioned above, in the six cases examined in detail in this
Note, at least six interpretations of the term "substantial" resulted.
The courts differed in their methods of interpreting the language
within the claims. The courts relied, in varying degrees, on the
ordinary meaning of the terms, language within the claims,
language in the specification, the prosecution history, and prior art
170 Thorn, 936 F. Supp. 1186, 1190 (D. Del. 1996).
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to arrive at their respective interpretations. There was no
consistent definition provided for the term; some, even recent cases,
discovered diametrically opposing interpretations.'7 1 This type of
terminology will continue to breed litigation and ambiguity in the
interpretation of patent claims. The need for uniformity in the
interpretation of patent claims is important as was stressed by the
Supreme Court in Markman.'72 The use of ambiguous terminolo-
gy within the claims themselves does not further this goal.173
The public and especially the competitor benefit from not having
to question whether or not the specification or prosecution should
be examined. An examination of the prosecution history by the
general public seems to run afoul of the purpose of the patent
system's requirement to particularly point out and distinctly claim
the invention. Additionally, the requirement of some courts that
the claim language be interpreted in light of the prior art is too
great a burden for society to bear when the language of § 112
requires particularity. How is the public to know which prior art
should be examined? This appears to be an unreasonable burden
at first glance.
An alternate method would be to require the patent applicant to
particularly define amorphous words within the body of the
specification itself or else be limited to a standard definition
included within the MPEP. For example, within the body of the
specification of a patent using "substantially vertical," the patentee
should be required by the PTO to define "substantially vertical."
The patentee may state something like, "substantially vertical
requires that the vertical surface be within five degrees of perpen-
dicular from the lower surface." This would fulfill the requirement
of § 112 without burdening anyone except the patent drafters.
What a small price to pay for clarity and definiteness in this area
of patent law.
Before a change is made at the PTO, when "substantial" is
utilized in patent claims, the only way to accurately determine the
interpretation is to file suit against a suspected infringer. If the
.See Thorn EMI N. Am., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 936 F. Supp. 1186 (D. Del. 1996) (according
interpretation to "substantially" that is diametrically opposed to the court in Chad Indus.,
Inc. v. Automation Tooling Sys., 938 F. Supp. 601 (C.D. Cal. 1996)).
'2 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).173 id.
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interpretation selected by the court is found to be unacceptable, the
unsatisfied party may appeal to the Federal Circuit for a final
determination. However, this litigation could be prevented by the
simple requirement of explicitly defining facially ambiguous terms
within the body of the specification or alternatively preventing their
use within the patent claims.
STEPHEN J. STARK
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